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Interview 
Martin Oppelt: “Thinking the World Politically”, ZPTh Jg. 5, Heft 2/2014, S. 263–277 
“Thinking the World Politically” 
An interview with Chantal Mouffe 








Oppelt: Just some months ago, you published a book called “Agonistics. Thinking the 
World Politically”. Would you tell us something about the composition of the book? 
What is the idea behind it, which objectives did you pursue, and how does it integrate into 
the broader context of your work? 
 
Mouffe: Well, first of all, it is a collection of talks that I gave over the last years and that 
have been rewritten to give them more coherence. All talks had to do with the develop-
ment of my “agonistic model” of politics and the objective was to present my agonistic 
approach to different audiences and to envisage its relevance in different fields.  
In the first chapter, I draw the main lines of my agonistic approach and distinguish my 
perspective from that of other agonistic theories because I am, of course, neither the only 
nor the first to speak about agonism. There are others, for instance, Bonnie Honig or Wil-
liam Connolly, who are influenced by Hannah Arendt or Nietzsche. I, therefore, thought 
that it might be important to clarify my personal view. I argue that in Honig’s and Con-
nolly’s conceptions, the main dimensions for politics – antagonism and hegemony – are 
missing. They both fight against closure, but they both ignore the nature of the hegemonic 
struggle. In the end, both celebrate a politics of disturbance, but ignore the important 
question of establishing the chains of equivalence among democratic demands and con-
structing a counter-hegemony. Bonnie Honig is right in insisting on the importance of ag-
onistic disputes, but in her conception, the nature of the agonistic struggle does not seem 
to be more than an ongoing contestation over issues or identities.  However, it is not 
enough to challenge what exists – the creation of new articulations and institutions should 
also be considered. William Connolly, who is influenced by Nietzsche, tries to link the 
Nietzschean “agon” to democratic politics and promotes the political virtue of “agonistic 
respect” emerging from the shared existential condition of the struggle for identity.  But 
in my view, he doesn’t address the important political question which concerns the limits 
of agonistic respect. Consequently, his conception remains at the level of an “ethos of plu-
ralism”. I emphasize the difference between ethical and political perspectives as well as 
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the necessity for agonistic theorists to acknowledge the link between agonism and antag-
onism instead of postulating the possibility of an “agonism without antagonism”. This is, 
I claim, the problem with Hannah Arendt because her idea of plurality never acknowledg-
es that this plurality is at the origin of antagonistic conflicts. That’s why in the end her 
pluralism is, in my view, not fundamentally different from that of Habermas. Despite sig-
nificant differences between their conceptions, both are convinced that you can reach 
consensus in the public space, and they do not see that every consensus is hegemonic. 
There is a chapter about the relevance of the agonistic approach for international rela-
tions and about democracy in a multipolar world. I argue in favor of a multipolar world 
and of envisaging the world as a pluriverse. In addition to my criticism of classical cos-
mopolitan conceptions in On the Political, in which I refer to Daniele Archibugi and Da-
vid Held, in Agonistics I expand this discussion to the new cosmopolitan conceptions. I 
also discuss whether a non-Western, non-secular form of democracy is conceivable. With 
respect to human rights, I scrutinize the Western interpretation which is currently domi-
nant, and I ask if this individualistic interpretation must be seen as a necessary condition 
for democracy.  
Another chapter outlines the relevance of my agonistic approach for the question of 
European integration. I suggest that the European Union should be conceived of as a 
“demoi-cracy”, which is composed of many different demoi. Moreover, I insist on the 
need to offer an alternative to neo-liberal politics, which, in my view, is at the origin of 
the current disaffection with the European project. 
In the fourth chapter, I contrast two models of radical politics. On the one hand, there 
is the strategy of a politics of “withdrawal from” as proposed by Hardt and Negri, who 
call for an exodus from the state and from traditional political institutions and for a rejec-
tion of representative democracy. On the other hand, there is my model of a politics of 
“engagement with” which aims at critically engaging with existing institutions in order to 
profoundly transform them. 
The last chapter deals with cultural and artistic practices and discusses what role they 
could play in politics and in the hegemonic struggle. Taking my bearings from Gramsci, I 
assert the central place occupied by the cultural domain is the construction of “common 
sense” and its importance in fostering counter-hegemonic practices. 
In the conclusion, I examine current protest movements in the light of the aforemen-
tioned ‘exodus’ and agonistic models of radical politics. I propose to see those move-
ments as an expression of the lack of agonistic politics in liberal democracies and I con-
tend they should be interpreted as a call for a radicalization of liberal democratic institu-
tions and not for their rejection.  
I take issue with protest movements such as the Indignados of the M 15 and the Oc-
cupy movement, which advocate non-representative forms of democracy and claim that 
representative democracy is an oxymoron. I argue that one cannot imagine democracy 
without representation. That’s the deep conviction that I have acquired over the past 
years, and I really want to develop this thought further because I think that under the pre-
sent circumstances, this is a very strategic issue. Is representative democracy something 
that needs to be replaced by non-representative forms, or is our current predicament due 
to the shortcomings of “really existing representative democracy”? Do we have to trans-
form and deepen the forms of representation we have, or should we relinquish them alto-
gether? These are the topics that I am interested in at the moment. 
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Oppelt: Your claim that a recognition of antagonism and hegemony as key concepts for a 
proper understanding of the nature of the political requires the acknowledgement of the 
lack of a final ground and the undecidability that pervades every social order. In addition, 
you say that there can’t be democracy without representation. Those assumptions remind 
me of Claude Lefort, who is perceived as one of the most important and influential think-
ers in the discourse of radical democracy. How important was Lefort for you and for the 
“radical democracy”? What do you and other radical democrats owe Lefort?  
 
Mouffe: First of all, I would like to dispel a frequent confusion and spell out the differ-
ence between radical democracy and the agonistic model of democracy.  Those two terms 
cannot be used indistinctively, as it is sometimes the case, because they refer to different 
aspects of my reflection. Radical democracy, as it is clearly a political project, is to be 
distinguished from other political projects, like the social democratic or the neo-liberal 
ones. The agonistic model of democracy, however, is something different. It is an analyti-
cal approach, formulated as an alternative to the aggregative and deliberative models, and 
it does not have a specific political content. 
With respect to radical democracy you also have to be careful when using the term  
undifferentiatedly. Even Habermas talks about “radical democracy”, so the term itself 
doesn’t say much about what is understood by it. In order to answer your question con-
cerning Lefort, I would say that the way thinkers in the United States or Germany, for ex-
ample, talk about radical democracy is – as far as I can see – not influenced by Lefort. I 
don’t think that Lefort had a particularly big influence on their conception of radical de-
mocracy. For me, Lefort was an important point of reference at a certain time, but of 
course, there are differences between Lefort’s thinking and mine. Particularly interesting 
for me was the debate between Lefort and Castoriadis. I was originally more influenced 
by Castoriadis because I come from a Marxist tradition following Althusser and Gramsci. 
You could say from a kind of a heterodox form of Marxism. Reading Castoriadis was im-
portant for me in terms of starting to see things differently, and I knew his work before 
Lefort’s. I then got to know Lefort very well personally and started studying his work. I 
soon became convinced that, in the debate between him and Castoriadis on the question 
of democracy, I agreed more with Lefort. Castoriadis, in fact, believed that there is only 
one form of democracy – the ancient Greek version of “direct democracy”. For Lefort, 
there is a big difference between this kind of democracy and what is usually called “mod-
ern democracy”, the form of democracy that arose from what he called the “democratic 
revolution” in reference to Tocqueville. By the way, I have used this term “modern de-
mocracy” as well, but I recently started trying to avoid it because I realized that it implied 
that with the Western form of liberal democracy, we have reached a more advanced de-
mocracy in terms of rationality or morality. Consequently, the Western model can easily 
be presented as being the only legitimate model, the model that needs to be implemented 
universally, a position that I reject. I agree with Lefort in that the distinction between “an-
cient” and “modern democracy” is important in the Western context, and that we are deal-
ing with two different forms of symbolic order. But I do not believe that the Western 
model should be universalized and that democratization requires westernization.  
I would like to stress that Lefort didn’t like the term ‘radical democracy’. When he 
read Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, he commented on our choice of that term in a crit-
ical way and he never used it himself. At the very beginning, he used the term ‘savage 
democracy’, which was later developed by Miguel Abensour and which, of course, is taken 
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from Marx. But from a certain point on, Lefort concentrated more on defending repre-
sentative democracy as the modern form of democracy. As far as I am concerned, I want 
to emphasize the necessity in the West of  radicalizing this ‘modern’ form of democracy, 
and this is, in fact, what we understand by radical democracy, a radicalization of liberal 
pluralist democracy. What we favour is a critique of liberal democracy that does not aim 
at erasing the existing forms in order to create something completely new. There are 
enough suitable symbolic resources inside liberal democracy to criticize and radicalize 
this model. If we take liberty and equality for all to constitute what I call the “ethico-
political principles” of liberal democracy, we can’t imagine more radical principles. What 
we should do is to force Western societies to put these principles into practice, extending 
them to increasingly more social relations. So from that point of view, “radicalization” 
does not require a total break with liberal democracy. What we, of course, criticize is the 
identification of “liberal democracy” with “capitalist democracy” and we understand it in 
terms of a political regime. By ‘liberal democracy’ we mean the articulation of the demo-
cratic tradition of equality and popular sovereignty with the liberal tradition of the rule of 
law and the separation of powers. This is an articulation that radical democracy would not 
destroy but it would give prominence to the democratic tradition over the liberal one. 
 
Oppelt: Your criticism of liberalism is strongly influenced by Carl Schmitt, whose work 
– that you once designated as a “real challenge” for you – is currently widely discussed. 
As a German, I am particularly interested in the reaction within the Left at the time of the 
beginning of your discussion of Schmitt, who, as you might know, is called the “Crown 
Jurist of the Third Reich”. To what extent has your discussion of Schmitt been a challenge 
for the Left?  
 
Mouffe: Well, that highly depended on the countries and their specific political and aca-
demic culture. I know, of course, that you Germans had and may even still have problems 
with the very name of Schmitt, which was almost a taboo for a long time. But in Italy, 
where I started to study Schmitt, things were different. I actually read most of Schmitt’s 
writings in Italian before I was later able to read them in German. In the 70s, the Italian 
Left discovered Schmitt, and a very interesting publication of the Concept of the Political 
with a new introduction by Schmitt was published. There were a lot of conferences about 
Schmitt at that time, and many of the most important Italian political theorists referred to 
Schmitt, so there wasn’t a problem at all. In France, however, he was not so well known. 
Raymond Aron had indeed published the Concept of the Political, and there were a few 
people who discussed his work, among them Jean-Francois Kervégan and Julien Freund. 
There was not much hostility, but there was also no extended discussion. In Great Britain, 
he was almost unknown. It’s really interesting how the situation with respect to Schmitt 
has changed. Today, it seems to me that he is even kind of fashionable. This might have 
to do with the influence of Agamben, and I sometimes have the feeling that people want 
to show that they are up to date and, for that reason, make references to Schmitt. So many 
people have begun to quote Schmitt or refer to his work, that it is really a bit too much. 
 
Oppelt: What surprises me is that in your discussion of Schmitt and of his criticism of 
liberalism and parliamentarianism, you don’t mention Rousseau at all even though 
Schmitt strongly refers to him. Why is that?  
 
Mouffe: Well, that’s quite easy. Schmitt tends to agree with Rousseau, and I don’t. I 
know, of course, that there is a lot of discussion about the proper understanding of Rous-
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seau’s writings. Some say he’s liberal, and some say (with good reason) that he’s republi-
can. For others, he’s the forefather of totalitarianism. For me, Rousseau was not really 
important. I would like to clarify by the way, that my relation to Schmitt is a very adver-
sarial one. He’s absolutely right in that you can’t imagine a society completely beyond 
antagonism. But starting from the Schmittian premises – especially his understanding of 
the political as the friend-enemy distinction –, I aim at showing the possibility of a plural-
ist liberal democracy. The problem that I have with Schmitt is, of course, his rejection of 
the articulation of liberalism and democracy, his claim that liberal democracy is an oxy-
moron. In this point, he paradoxically agrees with all those Leftists who today reject “rep-
resentative democracy”. Schmitt is also right when he insists that the idea of representa-
tion is not one that comes from the democratic tradition but one arising from the liberal 
tradition. But for me, it is precisely this articulation between the liberal and the democrat-
ic political logics that guarantees pluralism and that the rights of minorities are taken into 
account. In fact, I prefer the term “pluralist democracy” to “liberal democratic society” 
because what liberalism added to the democratic tradition was exactly the recognition of 
pluralism. In this sense, the liberal tradition has enriched the democratic tradition. You 
can clearly retrace this in the work of John Stuart Mill, which introduced the need to re-
spect minorities and the principle of liberty. Any form of majoritarian democracy could 
open the way towards totalitarianism. In fact, Schmitt himself says that Fascism and Na-
zism are necessarily anti-liberal but not necessarily anti-democratic – and in a certain 
sense, that is true.  
I must confess that I was much more anti-liberal before reading Schmitt, and paradox-
ically, I began to appreciate the strength of the liberal tradition through his work. While 
studying his writings, I became aware of the danger of animosity towards liberalism and 
realized what the liberal tradition contributed to the democratic tradition. So I don’t agree 
with Schmitt when he claims that there is a contradiction between liberalism and democ-
racy.  But on the other side, I also don’t agree with Habermas who says that there is a co-
originality between the principles of liberty of liberalism and equality of democracy. 
Schmitt is right to say that those two political logics are ultimately irreconcilable. You 
can’t have perfect equality and perfect liberty together. But contrary to Schmitt, I see this 
relation more as a tension than as a contradiction. I think it is necessary to acknowledge 
the way in which democracy became liberalized and liberalism democratized as C.B. 
McPherson showed. What is important to see is that there is always a hegemonic struggle 
between the logics of equality and liberty. One of these logics always tends to become the 
dominant one. The story of liberal democracy is the story of the conflict between those 
logics, a conflict between those who want to see the liberal principle become the domi-
nant one and those who want to see the democratic principle to do so. It’s the possibility 
for both principles to struggle for hegemony which can be seen as the condition for an ag-
onistic struggle.  In our present situation, the problem is that the liberal side understood in 
neo-liberal terms has become so hegemonic that everything that has to do with the demo-
cratic tradition is discarded and seen as obsolete. That is really a huge problem because it 
is very important to maintain the tension. When one speaks about “post-democracy” – and 
I do agree that our societies can, in fact, be called “post-democratic” – it is because the 
democratic has been totally displaced by the dominance of the liberal one.  
 
Oppelt: As for Rousseau, Schmitt and Lefort, Machiavelli is an important point of refer-
ence for you. As Machiavelli did, you understand the presence of antagonism as an ine-
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radicable source of society, and so did Schmitt, Lefort and – at least some would say – 
Rousseau. Leaving Schmitt aside, the previously mentioned thinkers are “Republicans”. 
How would you arrange your thinking within the tradition of republicanism, and which 
connection is there between the discourse of republicanism and the discourse of radical 
democracy? 
 
Mouffe: That depends on which form of republicanism you are referring to. In my view, 
Schmitt is right to say that political theory needs to start with a conception of “man as a 
dangerous being” and with what is sometimes seen as a pessimistic philosophical anthro-
pology, although it would be more appropriate to speak of a realist one. With respect to  
Machiavelli, he is definitely an important point of reference for me. Of course, everything 
depends on how you read him, that is to say, whether you read his work from a Straussian 
perspective or not. I like Quentin Skinner’s reading of Machiavelli very much and, of 
course, Lefort’s as well. They insist that in the Discorsi you find a defense of republican-
ism. In the debate between the “liberals” and the “civic republicans”, I definitely find my-
self on the side of the “civic republicans”. But I don’t think that both should be presented 
as two antagonistic positions because there are many different possible forms of liberal-
ism. That was something that Claude Lefort was interested in, although he never devel-
oped it. He was interested in working on the tradition of “civic republicanism” and in 
showing how far it was compatible with the liberal tradition. 
One could say that an important question today is how to bring together these two 
traditions and develop a “civic republican form of liberalism” that would introduce ele-
ments of civic republicanism into the liberal tradition. Indeed, if we envisage radical de-
mocracy in terms of radicalization of liberal democracy, a lot of insights from civic re-
publicanism could play an important role in this  process. 
 
Oppelt: As republican and liberal theories strongly disagree in their assumptions or con-
ceptions of the subject, could you specify your own approach to this question? 
 
Mouffe: I agree with the Freudian thesis developed by Lacan that the place of the subject 
is the place of a lack and that there is no essential identity but only forms of identification.  
A ‘subject’ is the result of different forms of identification. And identification always 
takes place in a context where there is power and hegemony and the ‘subject’ is always 
constituted through its insertion in practices. We do not, as in the liberal view, have an al-
ready constituted subject that would later enter into different practices. This anti-
essentialist perspective is very important for politics because it permits understanding 
how identities are constituted and how they can be transformed. Freud pointed to the im-
portance of affective libidinal bonds in the process of collective identification, and this is 
a crucial insight for envisaging an agonistic politics. 
 
Oppelt: So from the point of view of your own philosophical anthropology, you would 
position yourself closer to Freud than, let’s say, to Foucault? 
 
Mouffe: My philosophical anthropology is definitely influenced by Freud and the con-
cepts of Eros and Thanatos. For Freud, ‘Eros’ is the power that holds together everything 
in the world, and ‘Thanatos’ refers to the instinct of aggressiveness, which is inherent to 
all human beings. I think the death drive and the Eros are linked to the human condition.  
In Elias Canetti’s Masse und Macht, you find the idea that human individuals are 
moved by two main drives, one towards individuality and one towards the mass. We all 
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want to be singular individuals and – at the same time – be part of the mass or part of a 
collective “we”. I also find this vision quite useful to grasp the dynamics of mass political 
movements. 
 
Oppelt: When talking about your project of “radical democracy” and your theoretical in-
fluences, what exactly is, in this respect, the importance of being “Post-Marxist” today? Is 
Marx still an important reference for you, and if yes, in what sense? 
 
Mouffe: First of all, “Post-Marxist” is a term that we neither coined nor chose as we al-
ready made clear in the introduction to the second edition of Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy. It is a label that people attributed to us, and we somehow accepted it, provided 
that ‘Post-Marxist’ does not mean ‘Anti-Marxist’, that it’s not a general rejection of 
Marxism. What we were saying – and still say – is that it’s absurd to treat Marx as an 
endpoint. A living theory needs to develop; you can’t say that everything was given in 
Marx. We were – and are – convinced that a critical relation with the Marxist tradition 
was needed, and that some insights of Marxism are important. On the other hand, we 
didn’t want to stop there. So we developed some insights and discarded others.  I am not 
constantly wondering whether my developments are compatible with Marx or not. Marx-
ism was a certain and definitely important moment in my intellectual trajectory, but it is 
not an ‘identity’ that I would assume. There are a lot of people who are “rethinking Marx-
ism” and who really want to inscribe themselves exclusively into that tradition, but that is 
not my position. For me, to sum it up, Marx is just one of many authors who have influ-
enced my thinking. 
 
Oppelt: You said that you owe Schmitt your understanding of “the political” contrary to 
“politics”. This distinction is currently also a matter of a widespread discussion among 
many theorists coming from different traditions. How important do you consider this de-
bate about the relationship between “the political” and “politics” and in what respect? 
 
Mouffe: The problem is that this distinction is made in so many ways by very different 
thinkers that the situation is sometimes really confusing. For French thinkers like 
Rancière or Badiou, “la politique” (politics) is the important or emancipatory moment. 
Badiou, for example, reserves “le politique” (the political) for a critique of traditional po-
litical philosophy, while “la politique” (politics) designates his own position. For him, 
“politics” is the order of truth and the event. He strongly insists that for the event to occur, 
it is necessary to leave aside all facts and to be faithful to something which is not a given 
act of reality. Rancière, on the other hand, uses the term “police” instead of ‘le politique’ 
in contrast to “la politique” and for him, “police” is the less valuable dimension. For 
Lefort or Sheldon Wolin, “la politique” means the politics of the politicians, which for 
them is not that interesting and ‘the political’ (le politique) is the noble dimension. For my 
part, ‘the political’ refers to the dimension of antagonism, to the presence of radical nega-
tivity. And ‘politics’ is the ensemble of practices, institutions, and language games 
through which human coexistence is organized. So “the political” has to do with the onto-
logical level, and “politics” is situated on the ontic level. You never encounter “the politi-
cal”; it only expresses itself under forms of politics, so you can’t prefer one level to the 
other – you can’t think of a high and a low level.  Those who see “la politique” as the 
high moment usually believe that it refers only to the emancipatory dimension, and I 
don’t agree with that.  There are also forms of politics that are not emancipatory. Where 
the distinction between the political and politics might be useful, despite the possible con-
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fusion, is that it helps us to discern the language game of political theory and the language 
game of political science. All those who make this distinction – whichever content they 
give to it – are somehow working in the field of political theory, while those working in 
the field of political science don’t make it because of their empirical conception of poli-
tics. So this distinction is meaningful for those who address the political domain from the 
perspective of political theory and political philosophy. We can even say that this distinc-
tion is the condition for addressing this domain in a philosophical and theoretical way.  
 
Oppelt: You said that you don’t prefer one dimension to the other. Yet there are some 
critics who say that you are essentializing conflicts, and as a consequence, prefer the onto-
logical to the ontic level. What would you reply? And is this for you more a theoretical 
and less a practical problem? 
 
Mouffe: I am definitely not essentializing conflicts. I can only guess that those critics are 
targeting my conviction of the ineradicability of antagonism. They must be arguing from 
a liberal rationalist perspective that asserts that there is no conflict that could not be 
solved through reason. This thinking doesn’t accept that there are conflicts that cannot 
have a rational solution, i.e. antagonistic conflicts. This, of course, must be understood as 
an ontological thesis. It is a philosophical postulate and has nothing to do with an essen-
tialization of conflict. What we assert is radical negativity – a negativity that can neither 
be overcome in the Marxist nor in the Hegelian form. Contrary to the liberal view, Marx 
argues that class conflict is an antagonistic conflict, it cannot be resolved rationally. But 
for Marx, this was the only form of antagonism. Moreover, he thought that it could be 
eliminated. So the consequence of this conception was the communist illusion of a recon-
ciled society in which the dimension of the political would have been overcome. What I 
found interesting in Schmitt is that he didn’t disagree with Marx about the class conflict 
as an antagonistic conflict. But for him, there were many other forms of antagonisms 
emerging from many other types of social relations. This is why antagonisms cannot be 
eradicated because in order to do so, you would have to erase social relations and ulti-
mately society itself. In Schmitt’s view, you might eradicate conflict as a class conflict, 
but it would only pop up in another area. On that point, I agree more with him than with 
Marx.  
To develop philosophically the assertion about the ineradicability of antagonism, I 
have used the notion of the “constitutive outside”. This term was originally proposed by 
Henry Staten to bring together Derrida’s reflections about “différance”, “supplement” or 
“trace”. Staten showed that they all pointed out to the fact that the creation of an identity 
always implies the establishment of a difference and that the constitution of every form of 
objectivity or identity requires the presence of an “outside”. For Derrida, the condition of 
possibility of any form of identity is also the condition of the impossibility of an identity 
that would not have an exterior. It is what is meant by his critique of the “metaphysics of 
presence”. Freud says something similar with his notion of the unconscious which reveals 
that the full mastery of the subject is impossible. Those assumptions question two of the 
most central themes of modern philosophy: the full mastery of the subject and the possi-
bility of a fully inclusive form of rationality. Those are, of course, ontological postulates. 
In my work, I have been examining the consequences of the ‘constituitive outside’ for 
politics. When we are dealing with political identities, which are always collective identi-
ties, what is at stake is the creation of a ‘we’ and this requires the determination of a 
‘they’. Indeed, there is no ‘we’ without a ‘they’. There is, of course, nothing necessarily 
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antagonistic in such a distinction ‘we/they’, and it doesn’t need to be formulated in antag-
onistic terms as a friend-enemy relation. It can be a simple relation of difference, for ex-
ample, between ‘we’, the Catholics and ‘they’, the Muslims. But in certain conditions – 
and here Schmitt is important again – this distinction can always become antagonistic. 
This happens when the two sides perceive each other as friends and enemies, that is to 
say, as soon as the ‘they’ is perceived as questioning the existence of the ‘we’. So, to sum 
it up: If political relations are always ‘we-they relations’, there is always the possibility 
that these relations will become antagonistic. That’s why you can’t imagine a society 
where antagonism would have been eradicated because that would require the disappear-
ance of collective identities. But this is not an essentialist thesis! Saying that there is an 
ineradicable conflict between the Catholics and the Protestants or between the German 
and the French, that would be an essentialization. But that is not at all what I say. We 
don’t know where antagonisms are going to emerge, but there is always the possibility 
that they would emerge. It is, of course, an ontological thesis and people starting from a 
rationalist ontology would never accept it. I want to stress that ontological presupposi-
tions are necessary for any kind of reflection, but they cannot be proven.  For instance, I 
would never attempt to prove that my ontology is the right one and that Habermas’s is 
wrong. From a post-foundationalist perspective, that would not make sense. What I would 
argue is that if you start from the approach that I am advocating you can understand phe-
nomena that the other approach cannot grasp. I would, for example, argue that you can 
better understand the phenomenon of right-wing populism or the way in which conflicts 
erupt in societies. 
 
Oppelt: Your references to “political identities” and the republican tradition suggest that 
it’s the citizen who is the relevant actor in your conception. There are now some voices 
saying that with respect to your conception of radical negativity, there is a (maybe neces-
sary) lack of a positive definition of the radical democratic citizen. Would you agree? Or 
are you really convinced that it is possible to identify with abstract principles like equality 
and liberty or with the contradiction between them? Is it possible to identify with a para-
dox? Is that necessary at all? 
 
Mouffe: Let me first discuss how I envisage the agonistic struggle in order to answer that 
question. As you know, the agonistic struggle is different from the friend-enemy struggle, 
in which the opponents don’t share any common symbolic space, in which they don’t rec-
ognize the legitimacy of the claims of their opponents, and in which what they want is to 
eliminate their opponents. This is, of course, incompatible with a democratic society. An 
agonistic struggle requires something that I call a “conflictual consensus”. There is an 
agreement that as citizens of a liberal democratic society we share a common symbolic 
space constituted by the ethico-political principles of liberty and equality for all. What 
makes this consensus a conflictual one is that when it comes to defining liberty and equal-
ity as well as who belongs to the ‘all’, there will be profound disagreements. The agonis-
tic struggle takes place between neo-liberal, social-democratic, and radical-democratic in-
terpretations of those principles. Radical democratic citizen act according to a radical 
democratic interpretation of liberty and equality for all, and those who identify with a rad-
ical democratic project want to see these principles applied to increasingly more social re-
lations. 
There is not one single interpretation of the common good that all citizens would have 
to accept.  That doesn’t mean that we don’t need a reference to the common good, but this 
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common good is always contested. Lacan used to say “there is no meta-language […] and 
nevertheless it is necessary”. I would say the same about the common good: There is no 
common good, and nevertheless, it is a necessary point of reference. The hegemonic 
struggle in this respect is the struggle about the interpretation of the common good. It is 
the struggle for the definition of the accepted view of the common good. But this accepted 
view is necessarily a hegemonic one. There will always be other interpretations of the 
common good that are discarded. And this is why (in terms of citizenship) there is not one 
way of acting as a citizen but rather a plurality of ways depending on how you interpret 
the principles of liberty and equality for all. This is where I see the connection to the tra-
dition of civic republicanism. In this tradition, citizenship is not only a legal status, it’s a 
principle of action, and we need to re-introduce this dimension in our liberal societies. 
This principle of action will be guided by certain values and by a certain interpretation of 
the common good. This is what distinguishes a radical-democratic citizen from what we 
could, for instance, call a social-democratic citizen. The latter is less open to the demands 
of the new movements and prefers to fight for redistribution and economic rights. These 
are, of course, important things, but he or she would not be so sensitive to those demands 
that are not strictly economic and social. I don’t see what would be the problem in identi-
fying with a specific conception of the common good, be it radical democratic, social-
democratic or otherwise. We don’t identify with abstract principles. We identify with the 
implementations of those principles or with concrete questions such as the kind of poli-
cies and rights we want and for whom. Those are very concrete questions, so we are talk-
ing about identification with a project of society inscribed in a variety of practices, values 
and policies.  
 
Oppelt: Your conception of citizenship as a principle of action that needs to be re-
introduced in liberal societies alludes to the problem of “political apathy”, which current-
ly is definitely one of the most alarming and challenging phenomena. So when it’s theo-
retically possible to imagine a radical democratic citizen, wouldn’t you see that there are 
at least some practical problems as soon as it comes to the attempt to implement this ide-
al? Don’t the requirements of a conception of radical democratic citizenship overcharge 
“ordinary” people, if you allow that term? 
 
Mouffe: No, I don’t think so. Consider the situation when Hegemony and Socialist Strat-
egy came out in 1985. At that time, we were just at the beginning of the transition to neo-
liberalism, and the book was still written under the hegemony of social democracy. Ac-
cordingly, the aim of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy was to argue that democratic and 
social rights are important, but that there are also other demands that we need to take into 
account – the demands of the New Social Movements. The main policies of social-
democratic parties were not conducive to this. So at that time, we fought for an extension 
and radicalization of social-democratic policies. Today, the situation is much different be-
cause the rights that were established by social democratic policies and the welfare state 
have gradually been taken away. We are now in a situation in which we have to defend 
rights that we did not find radical enough some years ago. The neo-liberal hegemony has 
eroded economic and social rights. After 9/11, things got even worse because some civil 
rights have been under attack. The main motto now is “security”. It is presented as the 
main value, and in the name of this value, a lot of rights are simply left aside or eliminat-
ed. Today we are not in the position of offensively radicalizing democracy, but rather in a 
defensive position to defend existing rights that are threatened.  We are in a time when no 
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one really expects big advances. In the post-democratic circumstances in which we are 
living, what we are facing is a process of ‘de-democratization’, so what we need is a ‘re-
democratization’. This can be done in different ways and should not just mean going back 
to social-democracy. We should try to re-democratize and to radicalize at the same time. 
For some category of people, re-democratization is more important than for others be-
cause they have to defend what they have before they can fight for new advances.  
 
Oppelt: But who is in fact the actor on demand now, who has to initiate this process of a 
re-democratization? Social movements? Political parties? Political theorists?  
 
Mouffe: That question leads me to a point that I very much insist on in Agonistics. What 
we really need now is a synergy between political parties and social movements. The 
problem as I see it is that social movements (or a great majority of them) don’t want to 
have anything to do with parties and political institutions. They believe that it’s only 
through civil society that things can change. On the other side, you have the parties who 
insist that if you’ve got demands, you have to express them through traditional means of 
representation. The fundamental problem is that we are living in a post-political situation, 
which means that there is no real agonistic struggle between center-right and center-left. 
Left parties have moved to the center, and what they propose is to manage neo-liberal 
globalization in a more humane way. The hegemony of neo-liberalism led to the left par-
ties to accept that there is no real alternative to neo-liberal globalization, so they are una-
ble to give voice to a lot of democratic demands. As I said in On the Political, contrary to 
what people argue, the blurring of the line between left and right is not a sign of a more 
mature democracy, but is rather quite negative. The left-right distinction is important be-
cause it is the way in which the division of society can be put symbolically into scene. I 
would like to stress that by defending the left-right distinction, I am not implying the ex-
istence of some kind of essentialist content of left and right and their meaning change ac-
cording to different contexts. However, it is possible to distinguish them by the way they 
order the principles of liberty and equality. Parties of the right tend to put liberty before 
equality while parties of the left tend to put equality first and liberty second. This struggle 
between left and right needs to find ways of being fought through democratic institutions 
which is not possible at the moment because of the ‘consensus at the centre’. This is why 
we are facing a real crisis of representation. When the Indignados claim: “We do have a 
vote, but we don’t have a voice”, they are right. Indeed, we do not have a voice if we only 
have the possibility to choose between centre-left and centre-right, which is similar to the 
possibility of choosing between Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola. In those circumstances, how 
can you expect people to find the motivation to vote?  
Consequently, there are increasingly more protests taking place outside the repre-
sentative institutions. In my view the protest movements we are currently witnessing re-
veal that something is deeply wrong with the present state of representative democracy, 
and this is why in Agonistics I interpret them as a symptom of the lack of an agonistic de-
bate. But I also argue that these protest movements are not – and will never be – able to 
transform the existing configuration of power and establish a new hegemony on their 
own. The future of democratic institutions depends on the possibility of establishing a 
synergy between parties and social movements. For that synergy to be possible, it is very 
urgent for the left parties to be able to offer an alternative to neo-liberalism. As long as 
people don’t feel that here is an alternative, they will desert left parties. The mobilizations 
we are currently witnessing are important and necessary because they bring a lot of prob-
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lems to the fore. All those who criticized the Occupy movement for not having or offering 
alternatives or solutions missed the point because this is not the role of a movement. They 
pose questions, and I think that they should make demands, but it’s up to the parties to 
propose solutions. This is why they need to work together, and this is what I don’t see 
very much of. I was recently in Hamburg for an all-day-workshop, where I spoke with fif-
teen PhD-students. They were saying that for their generation, it’s ‘uncool’ to be in a po-
litical party. All of them were really politically interested, but none of them was in a par-
ty. I think that this is really a problem. 
The Indignados of the M 15 in Spain are a typical example of such a situation. They 
demand “real democracy”, but they don’t want to have anything to do with any organiza-
tion, party, or trade-unions. The result of their campaign for abstention was the defeat of 
the Socialist Party (SPOE). Many people who would have voted for the Socialists did not 
vote, and, as a result, the right-wing Partido Popular is now in power with an absolute 
majority. I can certainly understand their critiques of SPOE, but wouldn’t it still be better 
to have the Socialist Party in power instead of the Partido Popular? The urgent task is to 
find ways to open parties to social movements and to make the movements open to par-
ties. This is where political theorists might play a positive role. The last chapter of Ago-
nistics suggests the kind of intervention that one can make as a political theorist. One can, 
for example, discuss whether the movements should really fight representative democracy 
in order to install some sort of “presentist democracy” or “horizontalist democracy”. As a 
political theorist, I can point out the shortcomings of the ideal of  horizontalist or pre-
sentist democracy and explain why democracy cannot exist without representation. I can 
argue that the problem today is not with representative democracy per se but with its ac-
tual form. I can show that representative democracy can only work when there is agonis-
tic struggle and when there are real alternatives to choose from. If all parties offer more or 
less the same, that is not representative democracy at all 
 
Oppelt: Do we thus have to discern populism not as a danger but rather as a driving force 
for agonistic struggles and for the political life within democracies? 
 
Mouffe: Yes, that’s definitely true. I would even say that being populist should be seen as 
a political virtue! I am convinced that the only promising way to fight right-wing popu-
lism is by developing forms of left-wing populism. What right-wing populism did under-
stand is the role of passion in politics – the role of common affects. The mobilization of 
passions explains the success of right-wing-populism. For a long time, right-wing populist 
movements were the only ones that tried to challenge the consensus at the center between 
the traditional democratic parties. In that sense, the current protest movements are promis-
ing because they can be seen as a first manifestation of a left-wing challenge to this con-
sensus. But this is not enough, and those protests need to find forms of institutionaliza-
tion. We need left-wing-populist parties which articulate this kind of demands politically. 
Take Greece as a really interesting example in Europe. Syriza, as a coalition of different 
parties under the leadership of Alexis Tsipras, succeeded in giving a political leadership 
to the different movements who in the beginning assembled in Syntagma Square. The dif-
ferent progressive demands coming from civil society are channelled through Syriza. 
Syriza doesn’t reject representative democracy and aims to come to power through elec-
tions. But at the same time, it tries to offer an alternative to neo-liberalism. It is thus an in-
teresting example of how social movements and parties can work together. And that’s 
what is missing in Spain, for instance. Next to the M 15, there were popular mobilizations 
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as a reaction to the drastic austerity measures taken by the Partido Popular, but the 
movements there lack the kind of political leadership as we see it in Greece, and it is ab-
solutely necessary in order to have a real impact. 
To illustrate the kind of left-wing populism that I advocate, one could also take the 
example of the movement in France for which Jean-Luc Mélenchon was the candidate in 
the last presidential elections, the Front de Gauche. This is also a coalition of different 
left parties and in that sense, it is similar to Syriza, although at a smaller scale. Of course, 
the Front de Gauche is accused of being populist by the traditional parties as Syriza is. 
But in my view, this is where its strength lies because it  really tries to create a popular 
movement. Mélenchon’s mobilization of the youth in the 2012 presidential elections was 
remarkable. In the beginning, opinions polls only predicted four percent for the Front de 
Gauche. However, because Mélenchon is a very charismatic leader, he managed to mobi-
lize many young people and they ended up with almost 12 percent. Particularly interesting 
is the fact that France was one of the very few countries where there was almost no Occu-
py movement. I think the explanation for this is that thanks to Mélenchon and the Front 
de Gauche, many young people felt that there was still the possibility to act and mobilize 
through representative politics. What he offered those young people, in contrast to other 
countries (where they would have tried to express their disaffection in Occupy camps or 
even through riots), was the feeling that there was a possibility to fight for change inside 
the system of representative democracy and its existing institutions. That shows us that if 
there are parties that offer alternatives, it’s more likely that people get mobilized, alt-
hough there will always be people that don’t want to have to do anything with parties. I 
am convinced that there is a necessary populist dimension in democracy, because as pow-
er of the demos, democracy requires the construction of a collective will, a ‘people’. 
However this people, this ‘we’, needs to be constructed politically, and this requires the 
determination of a ‘they’.  The crucial question always is: who is going to be the ‘they’. 
For right-wing populism, it’s usually the immigrants and particularly the Muslims, as in 
the case of Marine Le Pen. For Mélenchon, on the contrary, the ‘they’ are the big transna-
tional corporations, financial powers, and all the other institutions that can be seen as cor-
nerstones of neo-liberalism. For him, immigrants and Muslims are part of the ‘we’ – part 
of the people. This is the main difference between right-wing populism and left–wing 
populism.  
 
Oppelt: You mentioned the need of democratic politics to win over young people. So 
let’s talk about the role of the so-called new media as they are mainly used by young peo-
ple all over the world. Now that we were witnessing ‘Twitter revolutions’ and ‘Facebook 
revolutions’ worldwide, would you still call the Internet ‘irrelevant’? Would you insist on 
your former statement that the mobilization of people via Internet is no real social move-
ment for you, maybe even no movement at all? At least you were using the term “autism” 
in this context? 
 
Mouffe: I am not saying – and never said – that the Internet and the new media are irrele-
vant. In the very example of Obama’s first campaign “moveon.org”, they were very im-
portant in order to gain votes for Obama. But that was, of course, no real social movement 
because a real social movement doesn’t exist only by sending e-mails. It must take the 
form of popular mobilization. If the energy yielded by “moveon.org” had been somehow 
institutionalized in form of demonstrations in order to put pressure on Obama, we could 
call this a social movement. A lot of people today unfortunately think that it is enough to 
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send an e-mail to be politically active, but there is a physical aspect of assemblies that 
mustn’t be underestimated.  
The Internet can be important in order to reach people, but for what kind of politics is 
that conducive? I think that this is the crucial issue and I fear that singing the praises of 
the Internet promotes a very problematic type of politics. Is this kind of mobilization real-
ly democratizing? The important question is how people come to organize themselves in 
order to be able to participate and change things. So, I think we should be careful cele-
brating the Internet as a further and important step towards more democracy because it 
can be used in positive as well as in negative ways.  
 




Oppelt: Do you know that there are two Facebook accounts named “Chantal Mouffe”? 
 
Mouffe: I know that, but I don’t even want to see them. I’m totally anti-Facebook! I un-
derstand that for some people the social networks might be attractive, but I find their im-
pact on the blurring between the spheres of public and private really worrying. It could be 
a question of generation and age, but I believe that the great luxury today is to be ‘inco-
municado’. 
 
Oppelt: How would you respond to those critics who call the theory of hegemony a “heg-
emonic great power” within the left that hides behind a minority pathos?  
 
Mouffe: Really? [Laughs] Who says that? Well, I wish it was, but I honestly don’t think 
so. In my view, Hardt and Negri’s call for “exodus” – their strategy of “withdrawal from” 
institutions – is much more widespread at the moment. This is a view that doesn’t want to 
be concerned with the state or with parties, and that advocates the self-organization of the 
multitude outside all kinds of institutions, and I find it very problematic. As I said before, 
our position, in contrast, is what I call a position of an “engagement with” or – following 
Gramsci – of a “war of positions”. In order to change things, you need to engage with ex-
isting institutions; you need to launch a counter-hegemonic struggle. I am deeply con-
vinced that it is much more conducive to developing an effective politics, but, unfortu-
nately, I don’t see where this position is dominant in the social movements.   
 
Oppelt: Does radical democracy have a normative deficit? 
 
Mouffe: Well, that’s the old criticism of the Habermasians. I confess that I am not inter-
ested in the kind of normative political theory that dedicates itself to asserting how the 
world should be without wondering about how we could get there. When asked to answer 
that question, some of those theorists answer: “I am a political philosopher, that is not my 
problem, that’s the politicians’ problem”. I prefer to start from a realist position, trying to 
understand how things are and how they work, in order to imagine if they can be trans-
formed. I honestly find grand normative theories somehow useless. Of course, there is al-
ways a normative element present when one engages in a research, but it is different from 
aiming at elaborating a normative theory. 
When I decide to examine a specific issue, my original motivation is always a politi-
cal one. For instance, in the case of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy our aim was to un-
derstand the reasons for the incapacity of Marxism to grasp the nature of the new social 
movements and to put forward a project able to articulate a diversity of demands which 
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were not class-based. We argued that this incapacity was due to its class-essentialist on-
tology and to its economistic approach, which did not allow it to recognize that political 
subjects were discursively constructed. It is in order to overcome those limitations that we 
had recourse to post-structuralism. The arguments of the book were elaborated at two lev-
els, political and theoretical, but the original impulse was a political one. I could say the 
same for all my posterior writings. The initial spark is always provided by a given politi-
cal conjuncture. My critique of deliberative democracy, for instance, comes from my 
conviction that it is vital for democratic politics to acknowledge the role of affects in poli-
tics and not to abandon this terrain to the right. In On the Political I have shown how the 
crisis of the left today is due to a lack of understanding of the necessary ‘partisan’ nature 
of politics and a mistaken emphasis on consensus. I think that the rise of right-wing popu-
list parties in Europe is linked to the fact that left parties were unable to offer alternatives 
to neo-liberal hegemony because they were searching for a ‘consensus at the centre’. 
They have accepted the claim that there was no alternative to the current neo-liberal form 
of globalization and are only trying to manage it in a ‘more humane’ way.  
 
Oppelt: So taking part in this ‘war of positions’, what would you say are the most pester-
ing challenges to be met for somebody who is committed to the radical democratic project 
today?  
 
Mouffe: I think the most important task today is to develop a counter-hegemonic offen-
sive to challenge neo-liberalism and to work towards developing a left-wing-populism. 
They are many different ways to do it, of being what Gramsci calls an “organic intellectu-
al”, and how you can contribute to that task depends on who you are. Artists and cultural 
workers have an important role to play in creating a new common sense. If you are an 
economist, you can elaborate an alternative to neo-liberalism in terms of economic insti-
tutions. As a political theorist, you can examine the reason for the crisis of representative 
democracy and imagine ways in which representative democracy can be transformed and 
made more open to the demands of the new movements. It is urgent to find ways to bring 
together the civil society movements and the political parties. If this synergy is not estab-
lished – if there is no way to channel the growing social movements and no possibility for 
them to be expressed through institutions – the energy found in those movements will get 
lost, as is the case with the Occupy movements. You can’t maintain this energy for a long 
time; there is always a certain point at which it needs to be institutionalized. In my view, 
the development of left-wing populist parties should provide spaces for the institutionali-
zation of those movements. In this respect, I find the  recent text of Die Linke, Verankern, 
verbreiten, verbinden, where they put forward their project for the development of the 
party in terms of a ‘Verbindende Partei’ with links to social movements, NGO, trade-
unions and as active in a multiplicity of struggles very interesting and really promising. 
